Opinion by Amalendu Misra for The Conversation
From “What I Saw in Havana” (Photo by Francisco Lozano/The Latino Newsletter)
Since the early days of Cuba’s 1950s revolution — which overthrew the U.S.-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista and replaced it with a socialist government led by Fidel Castro — the Cuban diaspora have played a large role in determining the island nation’s economic and political landscape.
The first wave of predominantly wealthy, white Cuban emigrants have for decades campaigned for a watertight embargo against their homeland. Many fled immediately after the revolution succeeded in 1959, primarily to the U.S., and have largely refused to visit their homeland on principle.
More recent Cuban emigrants who have left the island (again overwhelmingly to the U.S.) since the economic crisis of the 1990s are generally less affluent and have less political clout. They have forged cross-border links with friends and family members who remain on the island. Through the remittances they send back, these people are now a vital source of foreign currency for Cuba.
The regime in Havana has traditionally maintained a disdainful attitude towards the Cuban diaspora. In the early waves of migration, Cuba’s government officially referred to those who emigrated as gusanos (worms) — traitors aiming to overthrow the government. Expat investment in Cuba was subsequently banned.
But following recent negotiations with the U.S., this policy posture has changed significantly. After decades of restricting its relationship with the diaspora, the Cuban government announced in March 2026 that it would allow Cuban emigrants residing in places like the U.S. to return to the country, invest in the private sector, and own businesses.
In an interview with NBC News on March 16, Cuba’s minister of foreign trade and investment, Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, said: “Cuba is open to having a fluid commercial relationship with U.S. companies and also with Cubans residing in the United States and their descendants.”
Washington’s Blessings
The policy change comes as Cuba desperately attempts to rescue its devastated economy. A slew of economic and fuel embargoes imposed by the U.S. government since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 have led to a severe crisis in the country.
Many Cubans are struggling to find food, medicine, and other essential goods, while severe energy shortages are causing periods of complete blackout across the nation. The situation has become so dire that, for the first time in six decades, sporadic protests have broken out against the Cuban government.
In one of these protests, people in the central city of Morón ransacked a Communist Party headquarters. Videos on social media showed a group of people approaching the building with flaming objects, shouting “freedom, freedom” as they threw them inside.
The current state of affairs in Cuba has presented the U.S. with an opportunity to orchestrate regime change — something it has sought for years. And proclamations by Trump and his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, suggest this may well be the U.S. government’s intention.
In comments made to reporters in March, Trump said he believes he will have “the honor of taking Cuba”. He added: “Whether I free [Cuba], take it – I could do anything I want with it. You want to know the truth? They’re a very weakened nation right now.”
Rubio, who is the son of Cuban emigrants and has traditionally been hawkish about delivering regime change in Cuba, then declared: “Who’s going to invest billions of dollars in a communist country run by incompetent communists? … Giving people economic and political freedom is important, but they come hand in hand. They come together.”
Despite this rhetoric, many in Washington remain cautious about triggering an outright collapse of the regime. State collapse would almost certainly lead to an increase in the flow of Cuban refugees to the U.S. — something the Trump administration wants to avoid.
While weakened, the regime in Havana remains in place. The extended Castro family still wields considerable power and influence in the country. The men leading the talks with the U.S., Fraga and Raúl Rodríguez, are two of Fidel Castro’s great-nephews.
Cuba’s president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, has said he will not resign under US pressure. He told NBC News on April 9 that “the concept of revolutionaries giving up and stepping down [is] not part of our vocabulary”.
Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, later said that Moscow, a longstanding ally of the regime in Havana, had no intention of abandoning Cuba.
Despite publicly calling for fundamental reform to the power structure in Havana, Washington’s approach towards Cuba seems primarily aimed at using its leverage to encourage the regime to make concessions that diminish the island’s value to U.S. adversaries.
Originally published at The Conversation.
Amalendu Misra is a professor of international politics at Lancaster University, UK, and the author of eight critically acclaimed monographs on conflict and peace. His primary research concerns the interrogation of violence in the political process.
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