Opinion: Sanctions Are Not the Direct Cause of Venezuela’s Migrant Crisis

Opinion for The Latino Newsletter

Some days ago, Nicolás Maduro posted a video on TikTok where he said that “sanctions are to blame for Venezuelan migration.”

@nicolasmadurom

Todo el amor para integrar a los #MigrantesVenezolanos del lugar de donde nunca debieron salir, la República Bolivariana de #Venezuela, te... See more

While this claim is not new, he has doubled down on it since Trump envoy Richard Grenell met with him in January to negotiate deportee flights to Venezuela. The Venezuelan government insists on lifting sanctions as its main goal every time it participates in dialogue tables with the opposition and the U.S., so it’s safe to assume this is currently on the table. 

But that, the idea that sanctions are the direct cause of Venezuela’s migrant crisis is just not accurate.

In 2017, the first sanctions by the U.S. toward the Venezuelan government were enacted (all the ones from before regarding Venezuela were only addressed to individuals). What these sanctions did was prevent the Venezuelan public sector from participating any longer in the state’s financial system. By 2016, the year before such sanctions came to be, 82% of Venezuelans lived in poverty, and 52% lived in extreme poverty. The country was also, as reported by Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, the second most violent country in the world—a country not at war. Also, water and electricity supply failures have been common throughout Venezuela since the late 2000s.

These issues, catapulted by the Chávez and Maduro administrations, are the core of the Venezuelan migrant crisis, which started being recognized by the United Nations in 2015, before the 2017 sanctions. According to polling from last year, around 65% of Venezuelans would go back to their country if the opposition assumed government. Less than 15% say they would do so with Maduro in power, even if the economy improved significantly. 

More Sanctions

In 2019, the U.S. government followed up with sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA. Since most Venezuelans rely on government aid to survive and the government’s main revenue comes from the oil trade, these sanctions have certainly affected the country. After all, instead of helping diversify Venezuela’s economy these twenty-something years, Chávez and Maduro made the country dependent on imports.

But it’s important to know that it didn’t take a lot of effort for the Maduro government to alleviate some of those sanctions last year. By promising the presidential elections that were held would be fair and free, the Biden administration did, well, just that, alleviate some of the sanctions in 2023. But as we know, Maduro hizo lo que dio la gana, and the Venezuelan government took a more authoritarian route than it ever had. Because of this, the Biden administration imposed sanctions again in 2024 and at the start of 2025.

The Maduro government prefers to cling to power and maintain control over the population rather than commit to the will of the people to pave the way for social justice and democracy. Because of this, according to data from the NGO Centro de Justicia y Paz, intentions to leave the country have only risen since the wave of repression that followed Venezuela’s latest presidential election: the most conservative polls estimate that 26% of Venezuelans are thinking of leaving, while others estimate around 60%.

So, I insist sanctions aren’t to blame for Venezuela’s migrant crisis. I’m not asking readers to be anti-sanctions or pro-sanctions. But I do ask that when readers talk with Venezuelan migrants and refugees about their experiences back home, they be careful about potentially repeating Maduro’s propaganda, just Americans who are doing the same about Trump’s second term.

Whether the Trump administration strikes a deal with Maduro to relieve some sanctions to take in Venezuelans who have crossed the border these last years or not, the number of migrants will increase throughout the globe if political change does not occur in Venezuela.

About the Author

Carlos Egaña is a Venezuelan writer and modern languages teacher based in New York.

Now at 64% of Our 2025 Goal

Thanks to our 145th supporter, we are now at $12,781 in donations, 64% of our 2025 fundraising goal. If we receive another $2,659 by the end of February, The Latino Newsletter can continue until the end of March. If we hit our $20,000 goal, we have a runway for all of 2025.

We want to keep The Latino Newsletter accessible without paywalls. To help, you can donate here. Any amount (one-time or monthly) will keep us going.

What We’re Reading

Tariffs Talk: From our friends at The Mexico Political Economist, a good breakdown of the tariffs issue.

The Latino Newsletter welcomes opinion pieces in English and/or Spanish from community voices. You can email our publisher, Julio Ricardo Varela. The views expressed by outside opinion contributors do not necessarily reflect the editorial views of this outlet.